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THE METHOD OF UNIVERSITY STUDY.

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FOURTH LECTURE.—UPON THE STUDY OF THE PURE SCIENCES OF REASON, MATHEMATICS AND PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.

That absolute unity out of which flows all sciences, and into which which they return, is archetypal knowing (*Urwissen*), by whose penetration into the concrete, the totality of knowledge forms itself from one central point outward into its outer-most branches. Those sciences in which it (*das Urwissen*) reflects itself as in its most immediate organs, and in which the knowing, as that which is reflected, coincides with the archetypal knowing as that which reflects, are like the general sensoria in the organic body of knowing. It is from these central organs that we must proceed, in order to derive life from them, through various sources to the outermost parts.

For one not already in possession of that knowing, which is one and the same with archetypal knowing, there is but one way leading to its recognition, and that is by the contrast with other knowing.

* *Ueber die Methode des Akademischen Studiums.*

It is impossible here to explain how it is that we arrive at the cognition of something particular; so much may be shown even here, and that is, that such cognition cannot be absolute, nor, consequently, can it be unconditionally true.

This is not to be understood in the sense of a certain empirical skepticism, which doubts the truth of sensuous ideas—that is, ideas directed altogether toward particular things—on account of the illusion of the senses, so that if there were no optical and other illusions, we might be nearly certain of the knowledge derived from the senses. Still less in the sense of a general crude empiricism which doubts the truth of sensuous ideas on the whole, because the affections, from which they arise, first pass through soul to reach soul, and must, therefore, receive modifications in transition. All causal relation between knowing and being is a part of the illusion of the senses and, if the former is a finite knowing, it is so by reason of a determination which lies within itself, and not outside itself.

But the very fact that it is a particular knowing makes it dependent, conditioned, and subject to constant change. That quality of being particular which makes it possess manifoldness and variety, is the form. The essence of knowing is one, the same in all things, and for that reason cannot be determined. Hence, that which distinguishes (one) knowing from “another” knowing, is the form which makes its appearance in the particular, having its origin in the indifference of the essence which in so far we may call the universal. But form separated from essence is not real, is mere appearance, hence the particular knowing, purely as such, is no true knowing.

To the particular stands opposed the pure universal, which, as separated from it, is called the abstract. It is here impossible to make plain the origin of this knowing; it can only be shown that, when in the particular, the form is not an adequate expression of the essence, the pure universal must appear to the understanding as essence without form; where the form is not recognized in and through the essence a reality is cognized which is not thoroughly comprehended from the potentiality, as particular and sensuous determinations cannot be deduced from the general idea of substance in its eternal form; whence those who stop at this antithesis take for granted beside the general, a particular somewhat under the name of *matter* as the general source of sensuous diversities. In the contrary case pure, abstract potentiality is con-

ceived, from which there is no way out to reality; and this and the former view, to speak with Lessing, are the broad ditch before which the great mass of philosophers have always come to a standstill.

It is sufficiently clear that the ultimate ground and the possibility of all truly absolute knowledge must rest in this, that precisely the general, at the same time the particular, and that which appears to the understanding as mere potentiality without reality, essence without form, just this is also reality and form. This is the idea of all ideas, and from this source we have the idea of the absolute itself. It is no less evident that the absolute in itself considered, since being just only this identity, in itself neither the one nor the other of the opposites, but that as the identity of both, cannot manifest itself except either in the real or in the ideal.

The two sides of knowledge, that in which reality precedes potentiality, and vice versa, may again be contrasted with each other as real and ideal. If it were conceivable that in the real or ideal neither one of the opposites was more evident than the other, but the pure identity of both as such manifested itself, without doubt, there would be the possibility of an absolute knowledge within the phenomenon.

To conclude from this point, if there were, in the real, a reflection of the identity of potentiality and reality purely as such, it could appear neither as an abstract idea nor as a concrete thing: the former because it would then be a potentiality opposed to a reality, and the latter because it would be a reality opposed to a potentiality.

Further, as it would have to appear in the real purely as identity, it would have to appear as pure being, and, in as far as activity is opposed to being, as the negation of all activity. The same is to be seen from the principle already laid down, namely: that everything which has its opposite in some other is only so far absolute as it is again the identity of itself and its opposite, for, according to this the real can only appear as identity of potentiality and reality, in so far as it is itself absolute being, and hence must negate every opposite.

Now space is undoubtedly such pure being with negation of all activity, but it is not an abstraction—otherwise there must be several spaces, and space in all spaces is only one, nor is it concrete—otherwise there must be an abstract idea of it compared

to which it as particular would not perfectly correspond. But space is a totality ; in it being exhausts the idea, and it is because it is absolutely real, and for this reason only, that it is also absolutely ideal.

To determine the equal identity, so far as it appears in the ideal, we can make use directly of the antithesis with space, for since it manifests itself as pure being, with negation of all activity, then the other must represent pure activity with the negation of all being. But for the reason that it is pure activity, according to the principle stated, it is also the identity of itself and its opposite, that is of potentiality and reality. Such an identity is pure time. There is no being as such in time, there are only the changes of being, which manifest themselves as expressions of activity and as negations of being. In empirical time, potentiality as cause precedes reality, in pure time they are one and the same. As an identity of the general and particular, time is neither an abstract idea nor a concrete thing, and in this regard the same holds good as in space.

These examples are sufficient to show that in the pure perception of space and time, we have a true, objective perception of the identity of potentiality and reality as such ; likewise, that both are only relatively absolute, since neither space nor time presents the idea of all ideas in and for itself, but only in separate reflection ; that, for the same reason, they are neither determinations of its interior nature, and that if the unity expressed in both is the basis of a systematic knowledge or science, systematic knowledge or science belongs merely to the reflected world, but must nevertheless be absolute as far as form is concerned.

If then—as I cannot here prove, but will only pre-suppose as proven in philosophy—mathematics, as analysis and geometry, is based wholly in those two modes of perception, it follows that in each of these sciences a mode of knowledge must prevail which is absolute as to its form.

Reality in general, and the reality of knowledge in particular, depends neither entirely upon the general idea nor upon the particularity. Mathematical knowledge is neither that of a mere abstraction nor of a concrete something, but is the science of the idea presented in sense perception. The presentation of the general and particular in a unity is called construction, which is not really distinguished from demonstration. The unity ex-

presses itself in a twofold way. Firstly, to retain our example of geometry, in all its constructions which are distinguished among each other as triangle, quadrangle, circle, &c., the same absolute form is at the basis, and nothing is necessary to their scientific comprehension in particular beyond the one general and absolute unity. Secondly, that the general of every particular, for instance, the general and the particular triangle, is one and the same; on the other hand, the particular triangle stands for all and is, at the same time, unity and totality. The same unity expresses itself as that of form and essence, since the construction, which as knowledge would seem mere form, is likewise the essence of that which is constructed.

It is easy to make the application of all this to analysis.

The position of mathematics in the general system of knowing is sufficiently definite; its relation to the university course of study necessarily follows from it. A mode of knowledge which elevates knowing above the law of causality which prevails in common knowing as in a large part of the so-called sciences, into the realm of a pure identity of reason, needs to have no external end. Besides, however one may acknowledge the great results of mathematics in its application to the general laws of motion in astronomy and physics, one who esteems it for these results alone would not attain to a knowledge of the absoluteness of the science of mathematics, and this for the reason that generally as well as particularly these results owe their origin in part to a misuse of the testimony of pure reason. Modern astronomy, as theory, depends upon nothing but a transformation of absolute laws, which may be deduced from the idea, into empirical necessities, and has attained this object to its complete satisfaction. Moreover, it cannot concern mathematics, in this sense and as now conceived, to understand the least of the essence or being in itself of nature and its objects. For this, it would be necessary that mathematics itself should first of all return into its origin, and comprehend more universally the type of reason which it expresses. So far as mathematics in the abstract, like nature in the concrete, is the most perfect objective expression of reason itself, so far must all the laws of nature, as they are resolved into pure laws of reason, find their corresponding forms in mathematics; not as has been heretofore assumed, that the latter is determinative of the other, and nature but the mechanical part in this identity, but that mathematics and the science of nature are only one and the same science looked at from different sides.

The forms of mathematics, as now understood, are symbols, the key of which is lost to those who hold them, but which Euclid still possessed, as it seems from certain indications and the reports of the ancients. The road to re-discovery can only be by conceiving them as forms of pure reason and expressions of ideas which in the objective form are transformed into another. In proportion as present instruction in mathematics is little likely to lead back to the original meaning of these forms, philosophy will suggest on the road now entered upon the means of the solution and restoration of that ancient science.

The young student should pay special attention to this possibility, as well as to the important contrast of geometry and analysis, which correspond in a remarkable manner to that of realism and idealism in philosophy.

We have indicated in mathematics the merely formal character of the absolute mode of knowledge, which it will retain as long as it is not seized as perfectly symbolic. Mathematics still belong to the merely derivative world in so far as it shows the archetypal knowing, the absolute identity, only in reflection and, as a necessary consequence, is an isolated phenomenon. A simple and, in every respect, absolute mode of knowledge would, therefore, be one which had the archetypal knowing itself, in and for itself, as ground and object. But the science which is not derived from another, must be the science of all knowing, that is, philosophy.

We cannot here give any proof which would force everyone to acknowledge that philosophy is science of archetypal knowing. It can only be proved that such a science is necessary from the nature of things, and we may be sure of our ability to prove that any other idea of philosophy which might be advanced is no idea of this or of any possible science.

Philosophy and mathematics are alike in this, that both are founded on the absolute identity of the universal and particular. Hence both, so far as every unity of this kind is sensuous intuition, are altogether in sensuous intuition. But the intuition of the former cannot be, like the latter, a reflected intuition; it is an immediate rational or intellectual intuition, which is identical with its object—with archetypal knowing itself. Representation in intellectual intuition is philosophic construction, but as the general unity which lies at the basis of all, so the particular (unities) in each of which the equal absoluteness of archetypal

knowing is included, can only be contained in intellectual intuition, and are thus far ideas. Philosophy is therefore the science of ideas, or of the eternal archetypes of things.

Without intellectual intuition no philosophy! Even the pure intuition of space and time is not in the common consciousness as such, for they are only intellectual somewhats reflected in the sensuous. But the mathematician has given him the means of the external exposition; in philosophy intuition itself falls wholly within reason. He who does not have it cannot understand what is said of it, therefore it cannot, from its very nature, be given. A negative condition of its possession is the clear and internal insight into the nothingness of all, merely finite knowledge. It may be cultivated, it must become part of the character of the philosopher, his constant instrument, his capacity, to see everything only as it presents itself in the idea.

I have not spoken of philosophy generally, only as it concerns the first scientific education.

To speak of the use of philosophy I consider beneath its dignity. He who can inquire as to its utility, is certainly not even capable of possessing its idea. Of itself it is exempt from considerations of utility. It is for itself only; to be for the sake of another would be the immediate annihilation of its essence.

I do not consider it altogether unnecessary to speak of the objections which are raised against it. Philosophy does not recommend itself by its usefulness, but neither should it be limited in its outward relations by the seemingly dangerous influences which are ascribed to it.

FIFTH LECTURE.—THE ORDINARY OBJECTIONS TO THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY.

If I do not pass over in silence the reproach which has become so common, that philosophy is dangerous to religion and the State, it is because I believe that the most of those who have opposed it were not in condition to do the subject justice.

The obvious answer would be, what kind of a State and what kind of religion can that be which is endangered by philosophy? If there were really a danger, the fault would be in the pretended religion and the self-styled State. Philosophy follows only its own inner principles, and can concern itself little as to wheth-

er everything devised by man agrees with it. I do not here speak of religion. I propose, in what follows, to show the inner unity of both religion and philosophy, and the way in which one begets the other.

As respects the State, I put the question generally: In a scientific relation where is the right to say or fear that philosophy is dangerous to the State? In that case it will undoubtedly appear whether philosophy is of that character, or whether anything dangerous to the State can result from it.

There is one tendency in science which I hold to be destructive, and another that is corrupting to the State.

The first is when ordinary knowing aspires to the absolute, or to be a judge of the absolute. Let the State but once favor the belief that the common understanding is the umpire of ideas, and it would soon get above the state whose constitution founded on reason, it comprehends as little as it does ideas. The same popular arguments with which it expects to combat philosophy can be used, and more effectively, to attack the first forms of the State. I must explain what I mean by the common understanding: By no means alone or chiefly the crude and entirely uncultivated understanding, but the understanding cultivated by false and superficial education, to be content with hollow and empty *raisonnement*; which considers itself absolutely cultivated, and has expressed itself, pre-eminently in modern times, by deprecating everything which rests upon ideas.

It is to this emptiness of ideas, which boldly calls itself enlightenment, that philosophy is chiefly opposed. It must be conceded that no nation has succeeded better than the French in this elevation of the discursive understanding above reason. Hence, it is the greatest, and also an historical, absurdity to say that philosophy is dangerous to the preservation of the principles of justice. (I use this expression because there might be constitutions and conditions of things to which philosophy, though not dangerous, could not be favorable.) That nation, especially which (except a few individuals of former times who certainly will not be accused of influencing the political events of a later time), has no philosophers in any epoch, least of all in that which preceded the revolution, that nation gave an example of a revolution characterized by horrors of barbarity with the same wantonness with which it afterwards returned to new forms of slavery. I do not deny that there are in France *raisonneurs* in all science and

in all directions who have usurped the name of philosophers. But there would scarcely be one of them to whom one of us would concede it. It is not to be wondered at, and it would even be praiseworthy (if one were not otherwise persuaded of its dignity and importance), that a powerful government should proscribe those empty abstractions of which the scientific ideas of the French wholly, or in part, consisted. Empty notions of the understanding are, indeed, as incapable of building up a State as they are a philosophy; and a nation which has not access to ideas does right in searching for at least the remains of the existing ruins of past forms.

The elevation of common sense to the umpireship in things of the reason, necessarily leads to mob rule in the realm of science, and with this, sooner or later, the general exaltation of the mob. Dull, hypocritical talkers, who would like to put a certain sickly-sweet mixture of so-called moral principles in place of the authority of ideas, do but betray how little they know of morality. There is no morality without ideas, and all moral action is such only as the expression of ideas.

The other tendency, in which the first is lost, and which must conduce to the dissolution of everything founded on ideas, is the utilitarian tendency. If this is the highest standard for all things, it must also be valid for the State Constitution. But there is no more variable security, for that which is useful to-day will be the contrary to-morrow. But in addition this tendency by whatever influence it is propagated, must necessarily stifle all greatness and energy in a nation. "According to the utilitarian standard, the discovery of the spinning-wheel would be more important than that of a world-system, and the introduction of Spanish sheep-raising into a country would be more respected than the transformation of a world by the godlike power of a conqueror. If a philosophy could make a nation great, it would be one which rested wholly in ideas, one which did not devote itself to refinements of pleasure or make love of life the first motive, but one which taught contempt of death and did not psychologically analyze the virtues of great characters. In Germany—since no external bond has the power—only an inner bond, a governing religion or philosophy, could recall the old national character which is fallen into decay. It is certain that a small, peaceful race, destined to no great ends, needs no great motive; it is sufficient for such an one if it can eat and drink comfortably,

and devote itself to industry. Even in larger States the disproportion of means to ends which a poor soil offers, forces the government itself to favor this spirit of utility, and to guide all arts and sciences in that direction. Doubtless philosophy can be of no use to such States, and when princes begin to be increasingly popular, when kings themselves are ashamed of being kings, and wish to be only "First Citizens," philosophy likewise can but begin to transform itself into a citizen's morality, and descend from its high regions into common life.

The constitution of the State is an image of the constitution of the realm of ideas. In the latter, the Absolute is the power from which everything begins, it is the monarch; the ideas are—not the nobility, or the people, for these are notions which have no reality except as opposites of each other, but the freemen. The single real things are slaves and bondsmen. There is a similar hierarchy of the sciences. Philosophy lives only in ideas; it leaves to the physicist, astronomer, etc., all occupation with particular, real things. But these are, of course, only "eccentric views," and who still believes, in these times of humanitarianism and enlightenment, in the supreme relations of the State?

If there were anything able to check the progress of the stream which, more and more visibly, effaces the barrier between high and low (since the mob aspires to writing, and every plebeian to the rank of critic), then it is philosophy, whose appropriate motto is

Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.

After, and not without effect, philosophy had been decried as dangerous to the State and religion; the professors of different sciences finally raised their voices against it, as if it were also pernicious in this relation, asserting that it holds itself aloof from the elementary sciences, represents them as superfluous, &c.

It would, indeed, be an excellent thing, if professors in certain branches could step into the rank of the privileged classes, and if it could be established by the State that there should be no progress, or even any change, in any department of knowing. It has not yet gone so far, at least not generally, and probably never will. There is no science which, in itself, would be in opposition to philosophy; on the contrary, all sciences are one in and through philosophy. It is, therefore, only science as it exists in some human brain, and if this is in contradiction to the science

of all sciences, so much the worse for it! Why, then, has geometry remained so long in undisturbed possession of its theorems and in quiet progress?

I know that nothing is so calculated to inspire respect for science as the thorough study of philosophy, although this "respect" may not always be respect for sciences as they now are. And if those who have gained an idea of truth in philosophy, turn from the groundless, bottomless and inconsistent thing which is offered them under the name of science in other departments, and seek the deeper, more solid and more consistent, then it is pure gain for science itself.

That those who approach the sciences still fresh, without preconceived opinions, and with the first and still unperverted desire for truth—that these should be embalmed like intellectual mummies, and carefully guarded from every breath of doubt as to what has always been considered valid, even from the certainty of its invalidity, is at least offensive to my notion of right.

In order to be able to go into other sciences, they must first have received the idea of truth from philosophy, and surely anyone will be interested in a science in proportion to the ideas he brings with him. As I myself, during the time I have taught here, have seen a more general zeal in all branches of natural science revived through the influence of philosophy. Those who have so much to say of its injurious effects on youth, are to be found in one of the following classes: Either they have really acquired the science of philosophy, or they have not. As a rule the latter is the case. How, then, can they judge? Or, in the former, in which they owe to the study of philosophy itself the benefit of seeing that it is of no benefit; as they used to say of Socrates, that he at least owed it to his knowing that he knew that he knew nothing. They should share this advantage with others, and not wish to be believed on their word; especially as one's own experience will always make a stronger impression than another's assurance. Not to speak of the fact that their ingenious polemic against philosophy would be incomprehensible to the young, and their insinuations, however coarse, would be lost on them without that knowledge of philosophy.

The ordinary consolation wherewith they console themselves and each other at the fruitlessness of their warnings and admonitions is, "that after all, philosophy will not have a very long life; that it is only a thing of fashion which will pass away in time, as

has happened before; that, besides, new philosophies arise every moment," &c.

As for the first, they are exactly in the condition of the peasant who, on coming to a stream, thinks it is only swollen by rain, and waits for it to run off.

Rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis; at ille
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

As to the last—the quick change of philosophies—they are not in condition to judge whether what they so call are really different philosophies. The seeming changes of philosophy exist only to the ignorant. Either they do not concern philosophy at all—while there are even now efforts enough calling themselves philosophical which show no traces of philosophy: but if only to distinguish that which calls itself (without being) philosophy from that which is philosophy, investigation is necessary and, because those who are now young must in future investigate, philosophy must be studied. Or, if these changes are metamorphoses having a real relation to philosophy, then they are changes in form. The essence of philosophy is unchangeably the same, and there is a philosophical art impulse, as well as a poetical one.

That changes still take place in philosophy, is a proof that it has not attained its final form and absolute shape. There are higher or lower, more or less complete forms, but every so-called philosophy must have made progress in form. It is evident why the phenomena crowd each other, because the preceding ones sharpen the mind more directly and kindle the impulse. But even if philosophy is presented in its absolute form (and has it not always been as far as possible) no one is forbidden to study it again in its particular forms. Philosophers have this peculiar advantage that, like mathematicians, they are united in their science—all who could be so considered—and that, unlike them, they can yet be original. The other sciences may congratulate themselves when that change of form begins more earnestly in them. To gain the absolute form, the mind must try itself in all; this is the universal law of all free culture.

This conclusion that philosophy is a mere thing of fashion can not be serious. Those who present it would, for that very reason, endure it the more easily. Though not altogether in the fashion, they do not wish to be quite old-fashioned, and when they can seize upon something here and there, be it only a word from the

newer or newest philosophy, they do not despise it, but decorate themselves with it. Were it really but a thing of fashion, as they pretend, and if it were as easy to set up a system of medicine or theology on the newest principles as to change the cut of a dress or hat, then they certainly would not fail to do it. Philosophy, then, must have its own peculiar difficulties.

SIXTH LECTURE—ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY IN PARTICULAR

If knowing in itself is its own end, then it must be still more true and pre eminently so, of that knowing in which all else is one, and which is the soul and life of it.

Can Philosophy be learned, can it be attained by practice and industry, or is it an inborn capacity, a free gift bestowed by fate? It is evident from what has preceded that philosophy as such cannot be learned. Only a knowledge of its special forms can be gained in this way. But in the study of philosophy that knowledge of forms should also be aimed at, in addition to the cultivation of the capacity to comprehend the absolute which cannot be acquired. When it is said that philosophy cannot be learned, we do not mean that every one possesses it without effort, and that one can philosophize naturally just as one naturally reflects and combines thoughts. Most of those who are critics in philosophy at the present time, even those to whom it occurs to set up new systems, might cure themselves of this conceit by a knowledge of what has been already accomplished. What is now so common would happen less often, that people are converted to errors which they had already laid aside, by more superficial arguments than were believed necessary in the first place, if one would be less often persuaded that with a few formulas of words he could conjure up the spirit and comprehend the great subjects of philosophy.

That side of philosophy which, if not learned, at least can be trained by education, is the art side of this science, or what is generally called dialectic. Without dialectic art there is no scientific philosophy! A proof of it is seen from its very object, which is to represent all in one, and in forms which, belonging originally to reflection, still express archetypal knowing. All dialectic rests upon this relation of speculation to reflection.

But this principle of the antinomy of the absolute and its merely finite forms, as well as the principle that art and production in philosophy are as incapable of separation as form and matter in poetry, proves that dialectic also has a side from which it cannot be learned and that it, no less than that which according to the primitive meaning of the word might be called the poetry of philosophy, rests upon the creative capacity.

From the inner essence of the absolute, which is the eternal unity of the general and particular, there is in the phenomenal world an emanation in reason and imagination, which are both one and the same except that the former is in the ideal, the latter in the real. May those whose lot has assigned them nothing but a dry and unfruitful understanding, find compensation in their surprise that imagination should be considered necessary in philosophy. Instead of that which alone can be called imagination, they are only acquainted with the lively association of ideas which makes thinking more difficult, or else with the false imagination, which is a reproduction of sensuous images unregulated by law. Every true imaginative work of art is the solution of the same contradiction which united is presented in the ideas. The merely reflecting understanding seizes only simple succession, and understands the idea as synthesis of opposites, as a contradiction.

The productive capacity may be educated, elevated, and its power increased ad infinitum, and on the other hand its germ may be destroyed, or its development at least retarded. Hence if there can be any direction as to the study of philosophy, it must be rather of a negative kind. The capacity for ideas cannot be created where it does not exist, but one may prevent its being crushed or misled.

The impulse and the desire to investigate the essence of things is so deeply implanted in men that they eagerly grasp after the partial and the false, if it but has the appearance of truth, and offers any hope of leading to this knowledge. Otherwise it would be incomprehensible that the most superficial attempts in philosophy excite the sympathy of the most earnest minds, if these attempts only promise certainty in any direction.

The understanding which non-philosophy calls sound common sense only because it is common, demands in cash the ringing coin of truth, and seeks it without regard to the inefficiency of its means to get at it. In philosophy it creates the monstrosity

of a crude, dogmatic philosophy, which seeks to measure the unconditioned by the conditioned, and to expand the finite into the infinite. The species of inference which in the province of dependent beings reaches from one to the other, is supposed to help him over the gulf from the derivative to the absolute. As a rule it does not lose itself on such heights, but remains at a stand still at what it calls its facts. The most modest philosophy in this direction is that which although it makes experience the only or chief source of real knowledge, yet concedes that ideas perhaps have reality which is wholly lacking to them in our knowledge. One may well say that to study such a philosophy is worse than to know none whatever. The original object of all philosophy is to arrive by means of the facts of consciousness at something which is absolute in itself. To substitute for it this description of facts would never have occurred to any one if true philosophy had not preceded it.

Neither is mere doubt of the common and finite aspect of things, philosophy. It must become a categorical knowing of their nothingness, and this negative knowing must be an equivalent of the positive intuition of the absolute before it becomes genuine scepticism.

What is commonly called logic also belongs entirely to the empirical attempts of philosophy. If this is supposed to be a science of form and at the same time the pure art principle of philosophy, it must necessarily be what we have characterized above by the name of dialectic. But such a science of logic does not yet exist. If it were a pure presentation of the forms of finitude in their relation to the absolute, it must necessarily be scientific scepticism, and Kant's transcendental logic cannot be so considered. But if we understand by logic a purely formal science, opposed to the content or material of knowing, then it would be one of the sciences directly in opposition to philosophy, because the latter rests upon the absolute unity of form and content, or presents, in so far as it abstracts matter in the empirical sense as the concrete, the absolute reality which is also at the same time absolute ideality. Hence that is an altogether empirical doctrine which sets up the laws of the common understanding as absolute, for example, that of two contradictory ideas one only may belong to the same thing, which is perfectly true in the finite sphere, but is not true in speculation which has its beginning in the identification of opposites. In the same way it sets

up laws for the modes of the use of the understanding, as judging, classifying, and inferring. But how? Quite empirically, without proving their necessity, and therefore refers them to experience, for instance that it is an absurdity to infer with four ideas, or in one division to have opposing members which have nothing in common in another connection.

But even suppose that logic undertook to prove these laws on speculative grounds as necessary for this reflected cognition, then it would no longer be an absolute science, but a special power in the general system of rational science. The so-called critique of Pure Reason is founded wholly on the presupposed absoluteness of logic, which recognizes reason only as subordinate to the understanding. Reason is explained in this critique as the faculty of inference, while it is on the contrary a mode of absolute knowledge, just as the knowledge through the syllogism is throughout a conditioned one. If there were no other cognition of the absolute except by means of the conclusions of the reason, and no other reason except that in the form of the understanding, then, as Kant teaches, we should certainly have to resign all immediate and categorical knowledge of the unconditioned and supersensuous.

Such a misconception as Kant's is not caused by the fact that the natural barrenness of logic was aided by preliminary anthropological and psychological knowledge, which presupposes a healthy appreciation of the value of the former—as all who place philosophy in logic have an inborn inclination for psychology.

What is to be thought of this so-called science in itself is evident from the preceding. It rests upon a supposed duality of soul and body, and the result of any further investigation into what does not exist, that is of a soul in contradiction to body, may easily be judged. All true science of man can be sought only in the essential and absolute unity of soul and body, that is in the idea of man, consequently not by any means in the real, empirical man, who is but a relative phenomenon of the ideal.

Psychology ought really to be a matter belonging to physics, which on its side and on the same grounds observes only the mere body, and assumes that matter and nature are dead. The true science of nature cannot arise out of this separation, but only from the identity of soul and body of all things. No real antithesis is conceivable between physics and psychology. But assuming there was such an antithesis, we could no more easily un-

derstand how either psychology or physics in the same antithesis could be put in the place of philosophy.

Since psychology does not recognize the soul in the idea, but only in its mode of manifestation, and only in contrast to that whereby it is one in the idea, it has the necessary tendency to subordinate everything in man to a causal connection, to concede nothing coming immediately out of the absolute or essence, and thus to degrade everything that is lofty and uncommon. The great deeds of past time under the psychological knife appear as the natural result of several easily comprehensible motives. The ideas of philosophy are explained from several very coarse psychological illusions. The works of the great masters of antiquity appear to be the natural play of particular forces of character, and if, for example, Shakespeare is a great poet, it is on account of his superior knowledge of the human heart, and his exceedingly refined psychology. A principal result of this theory is the general levelling system of powers. Why should there be any such thing as imagination, genius, &c.? At bottom all are alike, and that which is designated by those words is but the preponderance of one power of the soul over another, an abnormality in contrast to which, in reasonable, ordinary, sober men, everything is in equilibrium, and hence in perfect health.

An empirical philosophy resting on mere facts, and a formal, merely analytic philosophy, cannot constitute knowledge, a one-sided philosophy cannot lead to absolute knowing, since it establishes for all objects of knowing but one limited point of view.

The possibility of a philosophy, speculative indeed, but limited, is found in the fact that while all returns into all and the same identity repeats itself in different forms at all possible stages, this identity may be taken at a subordinate point of reflection, and in the special form in which it there appears, be made the principle of an absolute science. The philosophy which proceeds from such a principle is speculative, because it needs only the abstraction of the limitation of the point of view, and the thinking of the particular identity in its absoluteness in order to lift itself up to the pure and simply universal; it is one-sided in so far as it does not do this and, in accordance with this point of view, projects a false and distorted image of the whole.

The modern world is in general the world of contrasts, and if in the old world, in spite of single movements, on the whole the

finite and infinite lay in one common sheath, the spirit of modern times first burst this covering, and showed the one in absolute opposition to the other. From the indefinitely larger orbit which fate has ascribed to the modern world, we overlook so small a part, that the contrast may easily seem to be the essential thing, and the unity in which it is destined to resolve itself only the special phenomena of a time. Nevertheless, it is certain that this higher unity which the idea recalled from infinite flight, as it were, will represent with the finite, has the same relation to the—in a certain measure—unconscious identity before separation in the old world that a work of art has to an organic work of nature. Be this as it may, it is evident that in the modern world mediating phenomena are necessary in which the pure antithesis appears, it is necessary that it should return in science as in art in the most various forms before it has transfigured itself to true absolute identity.

Dualism, as a phenomenon of the modern world, not only necessary from its nature but also necessary in its return, must have the preponderance throughout on its side as the identity manifest in single individuals can be counted for almost nothing, since these are rejected and proscribed by their time, they are looked upon by posterity only as remarkable examples of error.

Because in the condition of things in which the objectivities of State Constitutions, and even of the general religious associations disappeared, the divine principle of the world withdrew, nothing could remain in the externality of nature but the pure body of the finite devoid of spirit; the light had turned itself inward and the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity had to attain its highest point. If we except Spinoza, there is from Descartes, who expressed the duality with scientific precision, to the present time, no contradictory phenomenon; for Leibnitz also uttered his theory in a form capable of re-assuming dualism. By this sun-dering of the idea, the infinite also lost its importance, and that which had it was like that antithesis, a merely subjective one. To assert this subjectivity completely, to the entire negation of the reality of the absolute, was the first step which could be made to the restoration of philosophy, and was really made in the so-called critical philosophy. The idealism of the "Science of Knowledge" (Fichte) afterwards completed this tendency of philosophy, and this dualism has since remained unreconciled. But the infinite or absolute in the sense of dogmatism is more definite, and

has been abolished with every root of reality which it had. As an *in-itself*, it must necessarily be an absolute-objective altogether outside of the ego. This is unthinkable, because this positing outside of the ego is again a positing for the ego, and is, consequently, in the ego. This is the everlasting, insoluble circle of reflection which is presented most completely by the "Science of Knowledge." The idea of the absolute is in subjectivity, which it necessarily had by virtue of the tendency of later philosophy, and from which it was apparently displaced by a self-deceptive dogmatism, and thereby re-instated in that it is recognized as a reality existing only in and for action; consequently idealism in this form must be seen as completely expressed, and as the philosophy of modern times arrived at self-consciousness.

Descartes, who gave the first direction toward subjectivity by his *cogito ergo sum*, and whose introduction to philosophy (in his meditations) is, in fact, quite in harmony with its later verification in idealism, could not present these tendencies as entirely separated; subjectivity and objectivity could not manifest themselves as entirely separated. But he declared his real view, his true idea of God, the world and soul, in his physics, more unmistakably than in his philosophy, where it was possible still to misunderstand him on account of his depending on the ontological proof of the reality of God, this remnant of genuine philosophy. It must appear very remarkable that the mechanical physics of the modern world first took the form of a system in the same mind which developed dualism in philosophy. In the comprehensive mind of Descartes the annihilation of nature which idealism boasts in the above instanced form, was as true and actual as it was real in his physics. It cannot make the least difference in speculation whether nature is real in its empirical shape, in a real or ideal sense. It is perfectly indifferent whether the particular real things are real in the way in which a coarse empiricism conceives them, or whether as affections and determinations of every ego, as the absolute substance they really inhere in.

The true annihilation of nature is to reduce it to a whole of absolute qualities, limitations and affections, which can at the same time be considered as ideal atoms. For the rest, no proof is needed to show that a philosophy which leaves behind any contradiction and has not truly presented the absolute harmony, has not penetrated to absolute knowing, and is still less able to educate to it.

The problem which each must propose to himself, immediately, as he reaches philosophy, is, To trace out the one true, absolute knowledge of the absolute to its totality, and to the perfect comprehension of all in one. Philosophy opens, in the absolute and the removal of all contradictions, whereby this itself is again transformed into a limitation in a subjective or objective way, not only the realm of ideas but the true primitive source of all knowledge of nature, which is the only workshop of ideas.

I have shown the final determination of the modern world in the preceding to be the representation of a higher, all comprehensive unity, which is as valid for science as for art, and in order that it may exist, all antithesis must be dissolved.

Until now we have spoken of the inner antithesis in philosophy self. I shall be obliged to mention several external ones which have been caused by one-sidedness, false tendency of the time and imperfect ideas.

THE TRUE AND THE FALSE IN DARWINISM.

[A Critical Representation of the Theory of Organic Development. By EDWARD VON HARTMANN. Berlin: 1875].

Translated from the German by H. J. D'ARCY.

I. DARWINISM IN THE PRESENT.

Darwinism, undoubtedly, occupies a prominent place among the objects of present interest to the human mind. The principal works of Darwin and of Haeckel have gone through several editions, numberless popular productions are actively engaged in extending the new doctrine; and the scientific and popular discussions of the question in books and journals fill an almost inconceivable space. On the whole, there is observable a rapid advance, during the last eight years, of this method of looking at questions, though it at first had encountered universal distrust; and perhaps nothing has contributed so much to this advance as the zeal with which the theologians of all creeds, and the professors of the established philosophy hastened to oppose it. This